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ABSTRACT 
 
The disarmament and reintegration process of the more than 70,000 ex-combatants 
who participated in the decade long armed conflict in Sierra Leone has come to a 
closure. Most ex-combatants have drifted back to the rural and mining areas, working 
respectively as (semi-)subsistence farmers or low-paid diamond diggers. There is 
however a small group of urban-based former fighters making their living by riding 
motorbikes as a local taxi. This is an interesting phenomenon for two reasons; it is a 
totally new economic development in Sierra Leone, and the bike riders have 
organised themselves as a membership-based trade association drawing some 
inspiration from modalities associated with former fighting groups. The basis of this - 
much needed - modern and organic solidarity, so it is argued, lies in recognition of the 
general applicability of the law of contract to social life. It suggests that whatever the 
roots of the war in Sierra Leone – rural oppression, ghetto life, greed-not-grievance – 
the way forward lies through building not only employment opportunities for young 
people but also the institutional capital to protect and advance those opportunities. 
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Introduction2
 
The decade long armed conflict (1991-2002) in Sierra Leone between the rebel 
faction the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (henceforth RUF) and 
successive military and democratic governments –most time supported by Kamajors3 
- has been well documented4. Following the signing of the Lomé peace accord in July 
1999 between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF, the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (henceforth DDR) process of combatants started. 
However, it was only in February 2004 that the DDR programme was finally 
concluded. During that 5 year period more than 72,000 combatants, including nearly 
7,000 child soldiers were disarmed and reintegrated5. 
 
But the term reintegration of ex-combatants is somehow a peculiar one. It suggests 
that the ex-combatants need to be supported and equipped to make their re-entry to 
peaceful society successful, but does not ask if there is still something into which to 
reintegrate. It is assumed that the physical and social structures of communities exist, 
and continue to function. This assumption is especially troubling if and where these 
pre-war structures might be suspected of playing some kind of catalytic role in 
conflict generation6. 
                                                 
2 This article is based on research carried out as part of my PhD (see Peters, K. 2006. Footpaths to 
Reintegration: Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone. Wageningen University 
Thesis.) I am grateful to my former PhD supervisor Paul Richards and to The Netherland Organisation 
for Scientific Research – Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (NOW-WOTRO) for 
funding my PhD research.  
3 The Kamajors were the main Civil Defence Force, employing initiated hunters - in Mende, the main 
language of the south and east referred to as kamajoi or kamasoi [sing.], kamajoisia [pl.] - and used by 
successive governments as a proxy force against the rebels. 
4 See for instance: Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rainforest: War,Youth & Resources in Sierra 
Leone. (reprinted with additional material 1998). Oxford: James Currey; Abdullah, I. (ed.), 2004. 
Between Democracy and Terror: the Sierra Leone Civil War. Dakar: Council for the Development of 
Social Science Research in Africa; Keen, D. 2005. Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone Oxford: James 
Currey. 
5 NCDDR 2004. National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Final 
Reports: http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5_gov/5_3ncddr.htm 
6 cf. Archibald, S. & Richards, P. 2002. “Conversion to Human Rights? Popular Debate about War and 
Justice in Central Sierra Leone”, Africa 72, (3): pp. 339-367 
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Many villages, communities and towns in Sierra Leone suffered extensive destruction 
during the conflict, and many inhabitants were forced to seek refuge at some time or 
other. Over the decade long war more than half of the population of the country was 
displaced. The process of re-claiming and re-inhabiting villages and towns was 
already under way during the war, since the conflict was often localised. But it was 
only after the war that the bulk of displaced people returned to the worst affected 
areas. And return was more than a matter of making villages and towns function 
again: roads had to be safe and repaired to allow transport to resume, it was necessary 
to re-start legal institutions and re-elect local authorities, schools and clinics had to be 
rebuilt, and often, reconciliation activities were needed to make normal life possible 
again. 
 
If there was not so much at stake, one could describe the post-war rehabilitation of 
villages, communities and towns as exciting. To some extent this rehabilitation is as 
much a fight as the war – a fight in which contested claims concerning rights and 
positions surface. Some players “stood their ground”, remaining in the village and 
towns during the war, and subsequently claim privileges, varying from farming land, 
dwellings, to a voice on the village council, as reward for their efforts, which they 
view as keeping alive the possibility of return for those who fled. Then there are the 
early returnees, often younger inhabitants, who pioneered much of the actual physical 
rehabilitation of the villages and towns. Older people, or those who had the means to 
seek refuge in neighbouring countries, returned later. Generally, the last to return 
were the local authorities and patrons or “big men”, who - through their contacts or 
money - had the means to escape the bitterness of war and limit the impact of the 
conflict on themselves and their families. They returned with the hope or expectation 
that everything would return to “normal”, i.e. the pre-war situation would re-assert 
itself. But new powerful players and groups have arisen during the war. These include 
local Civil Defence Forces (hencforth CDF) commanders, who played an active role 
in protecting the villages and towns, and now lay claim to influence over daily 
matters, and women, displaced to urban centres where they saw a different, more 
emancipated lifestyle, who are unwilling to accept the pre-war situation anymore. As 
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a result, local traditional authorities are challenged by commoners, both ex-
combatants and civilians, who claim that their “eyes are open” as a result of the war. 
That there is more at stake than only the physical reconstruction of war-torn villages 
and communities becomes all the more clear when one realises that some of the root 
causes of the conflict must be sought in the marginalisation of young people through 
the pre-war attitudes of elders and traditional leaders7. Where the DDR process has 
been for many ex-combatants a test of the sincerity of the government and its 
proclaimed new direction, the process of post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
villages and communities is the test for local authorities and traditional values; will it 
be business as usual based on pre-war (traditional) institutions8 as tools for 
exploitation by local and national elites, or are changes going to take place based on 
more inclusive and democratic principles? Or to put it plainly - what social lessons (if 
any) have been learnt from the war? 
 
It is extremely difficult to give a general answer to the question how the reintegration 
process is going in Sierra Leone. Since there are so many factors influencing the 
reintegration process of an ex-combatant, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to state 
that every single ex-combatant represents a unique combination of factors. Some of 
these factors are obvious; for example if an ex-combatant has received a DDR toolkit9 
or not,10 or whether he or she has been fighting with the RUF or with the CDF11. But 
                                                 
7 cf. Peters, K. 2004. Re-examining Voluntarism. Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone. Institute for 
Security Studies Monograph 100, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies; Archibald, S. & Richards, P. 
2002. Conversion to Human Rights? 
8 An example of one of these traditional institutions is the customary court, controlled by the village 
elite and court chairmen who are “paying themselves” through arbitrary and excessive fines and 
exactions on young people (Richards, P. 2005. “War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2, 
1994-5, 1995-6”, Anthropological Quarterly, 28, 377-402, 2005). Exploitation of the labour of young 
people through customary law is a long standing practice (cf. Jones 1983) in Sierra Leone and the 
wider region (cf. Jones, A. 1983. From Slaves to Palm Kernels: A History of the Galinhas Country 
(West Africa) 1730 – 1890. Wiesbaden: Steiner). 
9 One of the options – and the most popular one - for the disarmed and demobilised combatants was to 
follow a 6 to 9 months skills training, such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, hair dressing etc.. A 
monthly allowance (normally about Le 60,000 (approx. $30)) for the ex-combatant in training was 
attached to this package. A toolkit with basic, but relevant tools was received upon graduation. 
10 But even in these straightforward cases complicating factors arise such as the possible stigmatisation 
(an obstacle for reintegration) that might take place after an ex-combatant arrives with a toolkit (a 
marker of DDR support, and thus of having been a combatant) in his or her village. 
11 A combatant with a RUF history who behaved badly in his or her village might not return home after 
the war but might then reintegrate smoothly in another location. 
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there are also many factors not taken into account in quantitative research12 that 
nevertheless play a role in the reintegration process: is the ex-combatant the oldest 
son of the father or does he have older brothers? Is the father still alive or already 
deceased? This affects whether or not the ex-combatant can assert control over 
resources, or is dependent on the willingness of older family members to be 
reconciled. The ex-combatant might indicate that land is owned, but how far is it 
away from the village or town and what is its quality? How long has the ex-combatant 
fought, and how severe is any trauma that he or she might have developed? Was he or 
she initiated into the secret society (Poro for men, Sande for women) before or during 
the war? Non-initiates will be regarded as an outsider or child, whatever their age, etc. 
The case story presented hereafter is to give a sense of one of the multiple trajectories 
of reintegration. Indeed, “align” might be a better term than “reintegrate”. It deals 
with a partial answer to the problem of lack of employment (and/or control over jobs 
by patrons). An interesting urban economic niche for ex-combatants unwilling to 
return to their rural communities is described. Some make their living by riding 
motorbikes as a local taxi. What makes this case so interesting, besides the fact that it 
is a new (post-war) development, is that the bike riders have organised themselves as 
a membership-based trade association drawing some inspiration from modalities 
associated with former fighting groups. But first some background information is 
given about the urban centres where this self-initiated reintegration activity takes 
place.  
 
 
Provincial towns before the war 
 
There are only four larger towns in provincial Sierra Leone, viz. Bo, Kenema, Makeni 
and Koidu. Kenema is the provincial capital of the east, about 300 kilometres east of 
the capital Freetown, somewhat adjacent to the Liberian border, and between 6 and 10 
hours by public transport from the national capital. It is located by a gap in the north-
                                                 
12 cf. Stavrou, A., Burton, P., Johnson, S., Peters, K. & Vincent, J. 2003. NCDDR Ex-combatants 2003 
Tracer Study. Unpublished report, Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund.; Humphreys, M. & J. 
Weinstein 2004 What the Fighters Say: a Survey of ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone, June-August 2003. 
CGSD Working Paper No. 20. New York: Columbia University 
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south ridge of the Kambui Hills, a finger of rain forest - now much depleted - 
providing direct connection to the three Gola forest reserves containing the greater 
part of the country’s remaining high forest, located to the south and east. Bo, the 
provincial capital of the south, is about ninety kilometres west of Kenema, on the 
same main road to and from the capital. Travelling time by bush taxi to Freetown can 
vary between 5 to 8 hours, depending on the time of the year, since a large part of the 
(once paved) road has become a dirt track. Both Kenema and Bo are found within the 
Mende-speaking part of the country. Makeni, the provincial capital of the north, 
currently about 4 to 7 hours from Freetown by taxi, lies north-east of Freetown on the 
edge of the boli-lands (seasonally flooded ancient lagoons at the foot of the highland 
escarpment that trends NW-SE across the country). The main language of the region 
around Makeni is Temne. Koidu, the capital of Kono district and the main diamond-
mining centre in Sierra Leone, is a further 3 to 6 hour journey east of Makeni 
(depending on time of year), making the travel time from Freetown a whole day’s 
journey. The hilly terrain around Koidu is the homeland of the Kono people, but as 
the major diamond region, has attracted labourers from all parts of Sierra Leone, and, 
like Freetown, can be considered a true melting pot. 
 
These four provincial towns have long been a magnet to young people from rural 
areas. The effects of the discovery of diamonds in the 1930s have been huge. Large 
groups of mainly young people migrated from all over the country to the diamond 
centres to work as tributors and diggers on a seasonal basis13. There are three main 
diamond regions – the area around Kono, the Sewa trench east of Bo, and Tongo 
Field, north of Kenema, though a fourth area south of Kenema District (Zimmi) has 
become increasingly important, and served as an important source of capital for the 
CDF during the war14. Kenema, Bo and Makeni are provincial head-quarters, and 
noted for government services, including regional education. Koidu is a true diamond 
                                                 
13 cf. Laan, H. van der 1965. The Sierra Leone Diamonds: an Economic Study covering the Years 
1952-1961. London: Oxford University Press; Greenhalch, P. 1985. West African Diamonds 1919-83. 
An Economic History. Manchester University Press. 
14 Fithen, C. 1999. Diamonds and War in Sierra Leone: Cultural Strategies for Commercial Adaptation 
to Endemic Low-intensity Conflict. (unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Anthropology, University 
College London). 
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boom town, with few functions other than servicing the diamond trade. When the 
Sierra Leone Selection Trust15 was based at Yengema (in effect a suburb) Koidu town 
was rich, with 24 hours electricity supply and many places of entertainment. At one 
stage there were direct daily flights between Freetown and Koidu. Kenema is the 
country’s second largest diamond area, drawing product not only from Tongo Field to 
the north but also from Zimmi in the south. It is also renowned as the centre of the 
country’s timber business. Before the war a government factory prepared timber 
(mainly for the national market) and made decent-quality furniture. A privately-
owned (French) saw-mill in Panguma also channelled product through Kenema. The 
timber business has revived in the post-war building and repair boom, but most of the 
logging and plank making is done by local chain saw operators in an uncontrolled 
manner. The protected forests of the Kambui North Reserve above Kenema have 
practically disappeared since the war ended. Although Bo is also an important 
diamond centre, channelling much of the product from the Sewa trench, it is a more 
diversified city than Koidu or Kenema, serving as a regional centre for trade in 
agricultural products, including rice, palm kernels and cassava, and noted as the 
country’s most important educational centre: the Bo government school for sons of 
chiefs (1906) was among the first secondary schools to be located in the 
protectorate16. Today – in addition to numerous secondary schools - it also has a large 
teacher training college and a para-medical training centre. Thus, there are other 
opportunities than diamonds alone that draw young people to Bo. It is noted as the 
provincial town least damaged by the war, and much of this is to be explained by the 
fact that its inter-ethnic youth population (in which students and apprentices played an 
important part) decided to resist the RUF17, and then again avoided serious division 
                                                 
15 Sierra Leone Selection Trust, a De Beers subsidiary, and later, a joint venture, linking De Beers and 
the state, used industrial techniques, both to mine alluvium and also to exploit kimberlite, though never 
on a major scale. 
16 In the year 1808 the settlement for freed slaves on the peninsula of today’s Sierra Leone was 
declared a Colony of the British Crown. In 1896 the British declared a protectorate over the hinterland 
(up to the boundaries of present day Sierra Leone, more or less). Sierra Leone gained independence on 
April 27th 1961. 
17 Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest. 
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on ethnic lines during the war’s later stages18. Bo was a main centre for the rise of the 
CDF, but there was a clear distinction between the unarmed civilian youths who 
protected Bo, mainly through excellent intelligence and coordination, and the young 
armed rural internal displaced people who flocked to the CDF. Makeni is the smallest 
of the four towns, but serves a diversified function for its region similar to Bo. It is a 
major market for agricultural produce (especially rice from the boli-lands), has a well-
known gara (tie-and-die) industry, is noted for its schools and colleges, and serves as 
an ancillary centre for the Kono diamond trade. This last function was boosted during 
the period of rule of the northern-dominated All Peoples Congress regime, when a 
main paved road was built through Makeni to the Kono diamond fields, after the 
railway, through Bo and Kenema to Pendembu, in Kailahun was closed in the 1960s. 
A second paved road was made from Makeni to the far north of the country (Kabala) 
in the 1980s. 
 
 
Provincial towns during the war 
 
Prior to 1997 the four main provincial towns towns suffered from the war in only 
limited and indirect ways. Kenema, Bo and Koidu came under direct RUF attacks, but 
these were repulsed in both Bo and Kenema. It was only in Koidu that the RUF 
succeeded in holding the town for some months. Because of its economically strategic 
function Koidu has always been heavily defended by the army. At several stages 
government troops closed the area to civilians. Many Sierra Leoneans are cynical 
about the reasons, believing strategic necessity played a smaller part than the desire of 
influential army officers to gain free and unobserved movement for mining and 
looting purposes. The RUF was never effective in taking over the major towns of 
Sierra Leone – though it clearly hoped to rally youth in Bo and Kenema – but it was 
effective in cutting the towns off from the capital, by disrupting road communications. 
From early 1994 the RUF created bush camps in strategic areas and from there it 
                                                 
18 Fithen, C. & P. Richards 2005. “Making War, Crafting Peace: Militia Solidarities and 
Demobilization in Sierra Leone.” In P. Richards, ed., No Peace, no War: an Anthropology of 
Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Oxford: Currey, pp. 117-136 
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organised its hit and run actions and ambushes. Usual targets were vehicles and 
convoys travelling on the roads between the major towns. As a result transport 
between the towns and the capital decreased day by day and at some stages ceased 
altogether. In mid-1996 the only feasible route from Freetown to Bo and Kenema, for 
example, was by air19. Clearly this had an enormous impact on the local economies 
and the food security situation in the towns. Food availability deteriorated for two 
main reasons: 1) local production of food in the countryside decreased due to threat of 
RUF raids and 2) many people from the rural areas had fled to the towns for safety 
reasons. 
 
The position of the towns as relative safe havens changed suddenly after the military 
coup in May 1997. The issue was that many government soldiers, stationed in 
garrisons around these towns, declared for the new regime – the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (henceforth AFRC) - and as a result of the junta and RUF 
agreeing a power-sharing truce, official enemies became allies overnight. RUF units 
were invited into both provincial towns and the capital, while at the same time CDF 
fighters had to seek cover in the urban areas or retreat into the countryside. Only in 
Bo, and to a lesser extent Kenema, could it be said that the CDF stood its ground. In 
Bo, the Garrison was in a quite isolated position to the west of the city, and civilians, 
resisting the RUF attack in December 1994, but distrusting the role played by the 
army, briefly imposed on the soldiers a humiliating “curfew”, forbidding army units 
entry to Bo town. Several soldiers who “disobeyed” the curfew were treated as looters 
and lynched by the citizenry. After the 1997 coup neither army nor RUF had much 
stomach for subduing the feared vigilantes of Bo. 
One by one these towns were taken over by CDF and ECOMOG20 forces during the 
first half of 1998, as part of the Nigerian-led counter-attack on the junta, intended to 
                                                 
19 A Lebanese company opened up a daily service from Hastings airfield outside Freetown using 
elderly ex-Soviet 17-seater planes. 
20 ECOMOG: Economic Community of West african States Monitoring and Observation Group. This 
West African peacekeeping force, dominated by Nigerian contingents, already had troops in Sierra 
Leone before the war started. President Momoh of the APC had offered ECOMOG Sierra Leone’s 
International Airport to base Alpha-jets bombarding Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia in Liberia. One reason for Taylor to support the RUF was “to let them taste the bitterness of 
war” and punish Momoh for supporting ECOMOG. 
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restore the elected Kabbah government by force. Then things went into reverse. Koidu 
and Makeni were re-taken by AFRC/RUF forces towards the end of 1998, and the 
rebels marched on Freetown for the first time. After the January 6, 1999 battle for 
Freetown, the AFRC/RUF was repulsed, and retreated northwards; Makeni became 
the de facto rebel capital until the end of the conflict. Bo and Kenema – where the 
CDF was strong – remained under government control, while the RUF controlled a 
cigar-shaped piece of land in the middle of the country, stretching from Buedu, in the 
Kailahun “pan handle”, where Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone meet, to Gbendembu, 
a boli-land town in the far west, but including, importantly, Koidu town and the Kono 
diamond fields. 
 
The RUF/AFRC allies were re-armed in 1998 by a Ukrainian-Israeli-South African 
business and military training consortium modelled along similar lines to the group 
involving Executive Outcomes21 that to a large extent decided the fate of the 1996 
Abidjan peace process22. This determined that the international community and media 
– who woke up very late to the war in Sierra Leone - perceived the fighting largely or 
only as a struggle for diamonds. But young people in Sierra Leone fought the war 
more for jobs than diamonds, and labouring in diamond pits is not a career choice of 
preference but necessity.  
 
Below, I will examine what happened to some of the more fortunate ex-combatants. 
One might expect, if indeed the combatant were after the diamonds, as the so-called 
                                                 
21 Executive Outcomes: a South-African mercenary group hired by the National Provision Ruling 
Council (NPRC) – a military government ruling Sierra Leone from 1992 up to early 1996 – and by 
President Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) – democratically elected and ruling Sierra 
Leone from 1996 up to present - to fight the RUF. 
22 While the 1996 peace negotiations continued, key RUF bases were attacked by pro-government 
Kamajor militias, with the support of mercenaries of the South African-based security-cum-mining 
company Executive Outcomes. The government argued that it was not in control of the Kamajor 
movement and thus unable to stop it breaching the cease fire. In November 1996 the Abidjan Peace 
Accord was signed between the Sierra Leonean government and the Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone. Officially the war was over but mutual suspicion between the former enemies resulted in 
neither of them disarming or demobilizing their fighters to any significant extent. Several RUF units 
continued to attack civilians in searching for food and ‘For their part, RUF fighters had been attacked 
by Kamajors, even after the Abidjan agreement’ (Keen, D. 2003. “Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, 
Alienated Youths. The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone”, Internationale Politik und 
Gesellshaft 2/2003, p. 85.) 
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“greed-not-grievance” model suggests23, that they would – given the chance – invest 
their demobilization gratuities and ill-gotten gains in diamond mining, but on more 
favourable terms (i.e. by acquiring licences to operate as tributors). But land-owners 
and government loyalists hold the whip hand in the diamond fields. Even if the ex-
combatants want to return to diamonds, they cannot, except as labourers working on 
very unfavourable terms. In the end many ex-combatants returned to the rural areas to 
involve themselves in agriculture. But there was a fairly large group of more 
urbanised combatants from both CDF and RUF whom enthusiasm seems to be 
focused more on motorbikes than diamonds or farming.   
 
 
An army of motorbikes 
 
The local economies of Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Koidu are recovering. But the larger 
companies once active in these towns – e.g. the saw mill in Kenema - had not been 
renovated yet. In Kono large mining companies are still in the prospective phase and 
have not become large-scale employers as yet. This lack is partly substituted by 
smaller and informal economic activities that are more labour intensive. Urban 
schools are operating again, and in many cases (unlike their rural equivalents) 
operated throughout the war with surprisingly few interruptions, except for a brain 
drain of teaching staff - many qualified teachers went to The Gambia as refugees, for 
example - and buildings undergoing repair. The internally displaced population 
continues to return to the villages from the urban centres where they sought 
protection. Many ex-combatants, profiting from DDR support, prefer to remain in the 
more anonymous, larger towns. Some of those who have completed their training 
have returned to their place of origin, but many prefer to hang on in towns in search of 
jobs. The perspective of going back to a village and becoming involved in farming is 
                                                 
23 cf. Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. 1999. Loot-seeking and Justice-seeking in Civil War. Washington, DC: 
World Bank, Development Research Group; Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. 2001. Greed and Grievance in 
Civil War. Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group; Collier, P. 2001. “Economic 
Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy”, in C. A. Crocker et al. (eds) Turbulent 
Peace, the Challenge of Managing International Conflict. United States Institute of Peace: 
Washington. 
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not very attractive, especially while the institutional obstacles24 remain in place. In the 
village they are exposed to risk of revenge,25 and it is questionable if ex-combatants 
can hide a violent past for long. In the towns on the other hand they move more 
anonymously, although ex-combatants are likely to know each other. So the towns, 
like the mining fields, offer the best social and economic niches for reintegration for 
those ex-combatants dubious about returning to home areas. But a job is needed, and 
employers, even if not scared of an ex-combatant’s past, are unlikely to rate ex-
combatants highly in a buyer’s market. One approach to this dilemma is for the ex-
combatant him or herself to create a new niche in the job market. One such niche is 
the phenomenon of the motorbike taxis, common in many Third World cities, but 
hitherto largely unknown in urban Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, it remains largely 
unknown in Freetown but has taken off as one of the most visible of post-war changes 
in the four main provincial towns26. It is an activity largely in the hands of ex-
combatants. 
 
Before the war local transport inside the towns and between town and countryside 
was provided by mini-buses and four-wheel taxis (small four door saloons) shared by 
several passengers (5 at the back and 3 in the front might not be uncommon). They 
drove more or less fixed routes, or at least remained on the larger roads. As a 
passenger it was necessary to walk to the nearest main road where taxis passed, flag 
one down, and ask whether the driver was going your direction, and find a place 
inside (something apparently always possible, even if a taxi was already jammed to 
                                                 
24 Richards has argued that the dislike of rural youth is not focused on agriculture as such, but on their 
vulnerability, in village conditions, to exploitation by local elites and gerontocrats, mainly to the 
control of these latter groups over customary courts (Richards, P. 2005. “To Fight or to Farm? Agrarian 
Dimensions of the Mano River Conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone)”, African Affairs, 104/417, 1-20, 
2005). 
25 Poisoning is said to be a commonplace of the village revenger’s art (cf. Bellman, B. 1975. Village of 
Curers and Assassins: on the Production of Fala-Kpelle Cosmological Categories. Mouton & Co.) 
26 This reflects the situation as it was up to mid-2003. A recent visit to Sierra Leone, in December 
2006, showed that motorbike taxis have now become a countrywide phenomenon, not limiting itself to 
the four provincial towns anymore. As a result of this wide coverage, besides the thousands of young 
people who have found a job as a taxi rider, it created jobs for young people in the villages along the 
roads. Motorbike repair shops and fuel stations have become part of the rural landscape in Sierra 
Leone. In addition, the services of the bikes riders are increasingly hired by farmers in deep rural areas 
to transport their harvest to the regional centres. Remarkable, Freetown is still more or less motorbike 
free.   
 - 13 - 
Dr Krjin Peters      From weapons to wheels: 
Young Sierra Leonean ex-combatants become motorbike taxi-riders 
Journal of Peace Conflict & Development 10, March 2007 at www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk 
the ceiling). Then, depending on your destination, you might have to change halfway 
to another taxi and walk the last few hundred metres or so. It was inconvenient and 
uncomfortable, but costs were low since the taxis were shared. 
 
This taxi system almost completely disappeared after the war in the provincial towns. 
Many vehicles were ambushed and burnt during the war. Owners - typically business 
men or women, or civil servants and other professionals - fled to Freetown or 
neighbouring countries, taking any surviving vehicles with them. Drivers lost their 
jobs, often reverting to whiling away their hours hoping for a casual contract, e.g. 
sitting in the marijuana-smoking pote behind the Kenema transport park in Bo. Only a 
few yellow cabs continue to ply the streets of Makeni, Kenema, Bo and Koidu. They 
have been replaced by motor bike taxis, mainly 125 cc Honda road and trail bikes and 
a number of cheaper Chinese brands, of which the Victor is preferred by passengers 
for the comfortable shape of the pillion. The advantages are that these motor bike 
taxis literally criss-cross the towns in search of passengers and even on the back 
streets it is only a few minutes before a taxi arrives. It then takes you straight to the 
preferred destination, without detours to hunt or deliver other passengers, or losing 
time in traffic jams. The disadvantages are that costs are two to three times higher 
than a car taxi, you get wet when it is raining (although many passengers somehow 
manage to keep an umbrella above their head during their journey) and it is less safe, 
since no helmets are (yet) provided for the passengers. Taxi riders unions battle to get 
the riders to wear helmets, but with little success, riders fearing the heat and catching 
TB from a multi-owner second-hand helmet27. Nevertheless the motor taxis have 
become an institution in Kenema, Bo, Koidu and Makeni. What makes this new 
phenomenon worth mentioning in a discussion about the reintegration of ex-
combatants is the fact that ex-combatants are disproportionately well represented 
among the taxi-riders. In Makeni, of the three hundred young people who are active as 
                                                 
27 Richards, pers. comm. based on unpublished interview with the Bo union executive in 2003 
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(taxi) bike riders, about three quarters were combatants during the war, according to 
the estimates of the Makeni Bike Riders Association28. 
 
The post-war bike (taxi) phenomenon was first researched in Sierra Leone by 
Richards and colleagues in 2002-3, with results briefly described in Fithen & 
Richards29 and Richards et al.30. Their data refer mainly to Bo and Kenema. The work 
of Hoek and De Jong is based on the situation in Makeni. I concentrate here on the 
Makeni study, with which I was associated31. 
 
An 18-year old rider in Makeni, Abdul, told Hoek & de Jong (2004:21)  
 
The war was exiting, but bad. To be a bike rider is exciting and good. (…) In 
the past nobody dared to jump on the back seat, because we were ex-
combatants, since they were afraid to be undressed, raped and robbed. They 
were afraid that we still had this rebel blood in our body. But such a thing 
never happened after the war [author translation].  
 
Why are so many ex-combatants now riding motorbikes and ferrying passengers, 
rather than robbing and killing them? Clearly, being a bike rider is a preferred job for 
young but uneducated Sierra Leoneans, filling the role performed by the four wheeled 
taxi driver in the past. But as becomes clear from Abdul’s statement, excitement is an 
important part of what drew fighters to the war, and the excitement of riding a bike is 
an acceptable substitute in times of peace. Perhaps - and rather worryingly for 
passengers! - if speed is high enough the amount of adrenaline released comes close 
to fighting. Ex-combatants who ride bike taxis are almost certainly the commanders, 
and others, who did well out of war. Most riders are owners, or have the bike on hire-
                                                 
28 Hoek, J. & de Jong, R. 2004. RAP4RIGHTS Raymzter Rapt met ex-Kindsoldaten in Sierra Leone. 
Plan Nederland & Spunk. www.rap4rights.nl 
29 Fithen & Richards, Maing War, Crafting Peace. 
30 Richards, P., Bah, K. & Vincent, J. 2004. Social Capital and Survival: Prospects for Community-
Driven Development in Post-conflict Sierra Leone. Social Development Papers: Community Driven 
Development/Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, 12. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
31 Hoek and de Jong gathered information on the bike riders in Makeni as part of a research and 
advocacy mission (2004) for Plan Netherlands and Rap4Rights. I accompanied this mission as an 
interpreter and guide, and was thus able to check their sources and findings. 
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purchase terms, and aspire to become owners, sometimes as part of a consortium 
keeping the machine on the road 24 hours a day. But ex-combatants who did well out 
of fighting might also have decided to invest in a conventional taxi. Drivers – of 
necessity - had to develop good ties with the various factions, simply in order to get a 
taxi, bus or truck from one place to another through numerous checkpoints manned by 
different factions. If we presume the nexus between transport owners and faction 
commanders to have been reasonably good during the war, we might have expected a 
goodly number of these commanders to call, post war, on owners they had helped, 
and apply for a driving job32.  
 
The key factor seems to be that combat provided fighters with a dense nexus of new 
connections, and ideas about social solidarity, that serve as a counter-balance to the 
pull of patrimonialism33. To become a bike-rider an ex-combatant might aspire to buy 
the bike outright, though this is unlikely, since few left the war with much, and the 
costs are high (2 to 3 million Leones [1 to 1.5 thousand US$]), though not so 
astronomical as acquiring a cab, where a patron would definitely be necessary. The 
more general pattern - in Bo at least, according to Richards et al.34 - is to take a bike 
on hire purchase from the Guinean businessmen who bring (smuggle?) Chinese bikes 
from Conakry. Bikes are quickly confiscated when there is any default, after which 
the businessman can sell the bike to another potential rider, or revert to the old 
system, and hire a rider as he might once have found a driver. One way to ensure 
there is no default is to join together with one or two former comrades and ride the 
bike night and day, seven days a week. The ex-combatants with a hire-purchase 
contract can find trusty comrades from among those who were bonded by life-and-
death struggles in the bush. Bonds created in war have not lost their value, especially 
                                                 
32 In Liberia many ex-combatants were selling gasoline and petrol on a small scale. During the war 
their commanders were in charge of these fuel reserves and remained in this position in between (i.e. in 
1997-2000) and after the war, employing some of their most loyal fighters. 
33 Reno describes in detail the rise of a post-independence socio-political system in Sierra Leone, based 
on patrimonial principles (Reno, W. 1995. Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. University 
Press Cambridge). According to Richards: ‘patrimonialism is a systematic scaling up, at the national 
level, of local ideas about patron-client linkages, shaped (in Sierra Leone) in the days of direct 
extraction of forest resources, about the duty of the rich and successful to protect, support and promote 
their followers and friends’ (Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest, p. 34). 
34 Richards, P., Bah, K. & Vincent, J. Social Capital and Survival 
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in an activity that recapitulates some of the excitement and danger of handling a 
weapon, and where the group interest is protected by the application of equal amounts 
of riding skill among all partners on a daily basis. 
 
Some important regional differences must be noted here, however. In Bo and Kenema 
the more usual practice is that a businessman provides the bike and the rider leases it, 
but after a time becomes the owner (i.e. it is a hire purchase contract)35. For this 
reason the union is known as the bike renters association. But in Makeni, the riders 
only rent the bikes from the owners, and do not own the machine eventually. This 
may reflect the fact that although RUF ex-combatants are quite numerous in the Bo 
and Kenema association ex-CDF fighters are in the majority, whereas in Makeni the 
background of most riders is RUF. Businessmen may have more confidence in ex-
CDF types. Whatever the reason, it suggests fighters of CDF background have an 
advantage in extracting better terms. 
 
A final factor worth discussing is the nature of the niche. The activity is new. If ex-
combatants had trained in traditional skills as part of the disarmament and 
reintegration support, such as carpentry or tailoring, they would have to compete with 
carpenters or tailors already active before the war. Confidence or bravery as ex-
combatants might count for little with potential customers. But there were no bike 
taxis in Sierra Leone before the war, and the modality seems a great step forward to 
busy women traders, among the major customers, in a spread-out town like Bo or 
Makeni. Ex-combatant riders may even be perceived as particularly useful pilots in 
out-of-town or after-dark trips where there is risk of robbery. Bike-jacking is indeed a 
problem in Bo, but somewhat mitigated by mobile phones and growing cooperation 
between police and riders’ union36.  
 
 
 
                                                 
35 In 2003 this was Le 20,000/day. A ride cost Le 1000. So it is only after 20 rides (plus fuel costs) that 
the rider starts to make a profit on the day’s work 
36 Richards, pers. comm. 
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Institutional modernisation; the law of contract 
 
A general point becomes clear. Skills training for demobilization might work better if 
it equips ex-combatants to supply new socially-necessary services. The urban areas, as 
the bike case suggests, might be left to the hidden hand of the market. But rural areas 
might benefit from hitherto scarce skills, of a kind generally provided by Non 
Governmental Organisations, such as well digging, latrine construction, plantation 
rehabilitation or swamp development. It is possible to envisage training (including 
business skills) that equips ex-combatants for these tasks, organising trainees into 
small construction gangs, and then establishs a system in which rural communities use 
vouchers to purchase the service of choice from competing gangs. 
 
The message of this article is that there is the need for institutional modernization, 
suitable to the needs and aspirations of youth. What makes the bike riders 
development interesting on the institutional level is that it is an example of post-war 
organisation around shared labour interests rather than ethnicity. The Bo union told 
Richards et al.37 that they had members from both CDF and RUF, and stressed that 
this was a decisive break with war-time organization; the CDF was – despite some 
attempts to make it appear otherwise – a strongly ethnicized organization, and the 
RUF was widely perceived as being a kind of sect – a “secret society” [sodality] of 
rarrays38 or lumpens39. This perpetuated some of the pre-modern mentalities 
associated with intra-youth egalitarian organization, such as rural labour gangs, 
diamond digging crews, in which big men and patrons were always hovering in the 
background to confiscate the output, and ensure a snug fit with the hierarchical world 
                                                 
37 Richards, P., Bah, K. & Vincent, J. Social Capital and Survival 
38 The Krio Dictionary claims rare derives from the mispronunciation of the English word “rare” (i.e. 
unusual) by 18th century Savoyard entertainers advertising their shows on the streets of London, though 
in local usage in Sierra Leone it tends to assimilate more to the notion of “run-away” (i.e. vagrant, 
street youth). According to Abdullah “rarray culture” is: ‘… a male-specific oppositional sub-culture 
which easily lends itself to violence’ (Abdullah, I. 1997, p. 50. “Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin 
and Character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL)”, Africa Development, 22, (3/4): 45-76. 
Special Issue: “Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War”.) 
39 According to Ishmail Rashid, “lumpen”: ‘…represent that strata of the society that cannot fully 
employ or sell its labour because of capitalist transformation, restructuring or retrenchment. [Marx, K. 
& Engels, F. 1955, p. 20-21. The Communist Manifesta, New York ] (Rashid, I. 1997. p. 22-23 
“Subaltern Reactions: Lumpens, Students and the Left’, African Development 22 (3/4): 19-44.) 
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over which elders and chiefs presided40. The bike riders associations are different. In 
all towns a rider’s association has been created specifically to protect the stake of the 
riders against the business men providing the bikes, and the police and road transport 
authority applying traffic laws, often in quite problematic and corrupt ways. The 
unions not only look after the interests of sick or injured riders, resolve disputes 
between riders and customers, and generally interest themselves in health, safety and 
innovation, but they are also explicit about the need to take on and challenge the pre-
war patrimonial order. The Bo union told Richards et al.41 that they no longer trust 
“big men” patrons, who they view as having caused the war by fooling youth into 
fighting without any real reward. They prefer now to follow a commercial route, and 
have hired a commercial lawyer in Freetown to fight “class action” cases, e.g. against 
the police, who had been harassing riders over registration papers for which they had 
paid but which were deliberately held back – they alleged – by the authorities. The 
role and strength of the association becomes clear from the following example; police 
harassment of riders for bribes and fines resulted in ‘confrontation between riders and 
the police in both Kenema and Bo, the arrest of 32 riders and imposition of high fines 
(averaging Le 100,000  approximately 50 US$). The association went on strike, 
supported by women traders, who are among the major clients of the two-wheeled 
taxis. According to the executive [of the Bo Bike Riders Association], the 
confrontation required the intervention of the [British-seconded] Inspector-General of 
police, and court action by the association’s lawyer, who succeeded in having fines 
reduced by an average of 40 per cent.’42. Explicitly, the Bo association is fighting a 
“war” for its young members, but not any more through force of arms, but through the 
classic instruments of trade unionism43. Job interests, strikes and the law of contract 
have become the weapons of choice, not forced recruitment and summary executions.  
                                                 
40 The solidarity of combatants generated in “fighting” has survived the war but applied to a different 
“job”, riding a motorbike taxi. The union is a key difference, however, since this is the means to link 
(through peaceful conflict management) with the wider society. In Professional Ethics and Civic 
Morals Durkheim lays stress on the emergence of medieval European guilds as a basis for organic 
solidarity (Durkheim, E. 1957 [c. 1890-1900] Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. London: 
Routledge (trans. Cornelia Brookfield).  
41 Richards, P., Bah, K. & Vincent, J. Social Capital and Survival 
42 Richards, P., Bah, K. & Vincent, J. Social Capital and Survival, p. 36 
43 Fithen & Richards, Maing War, Crafting Peace. 
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The role of the union is also important in Makeni. According to the executive of the 
Makeni Bike Rider Association:  
 
Our members were quite wild before. When they were still carrying guns 
they could intimidate everybody, but now they have to stick to the rules. No 
violence, no drugs and of course the traffic rules. If for instance someone 
rides too fast, we confiscate the bike for a few day44.  
 
The various bike rider associations are telling examples of the levels of reconciliation 
and reintegration possible for even the most battle-hardened ex-combatants. 
According to the Makeni executive:  
 
Boys who have fought against each other, now work together. People try to 
live after the war as brothers, but if you do not have any job, you are likely to 
see each other much faster as enemies again45.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a way the conflict in Sierra Leone has come full circle. It began with young fighters 
roaring the diamond towns in eastern Sierra Leone, in the early days of an insurgency 
that mopped up unemployed young people and inducted them into a dangerous world 
of armed combat. Eleven years of war attacked traditional if problematic rural 
solidarities, and questioned many social values. The young combatants are once again 
roaring about the main towns of provincial Sierra Leone. But this time the tool is not 
the AK-47 but the Honda trail bike taxi. Former fighters are laying the foundations for 
a new, post-war modality of solidarity based on craft unionism. More generally, ex-
combatants in the provincial towns are in a different position to those who remain in 
the diamond fields as diggers, or who have returned to the countryside to farm. The 
urban bike taxi riders now fight with the law of contract, not guns. This is consistent 
                                                 
44 Hoek & de Jong 2004 (my translation) Raymzter Rapt, p. 21 
45 Hoek & de Jong 2004 (my translation) Raymzter Rapt, p.21 
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with Durkheim’s argument that the basis of modern (organic) solidarity lies in 
recognition of the general applicability of the law of contract to social life46. It 
suggests that whatever the roots of the war in Sierra Leone – rural oppression, ghetto 
life, greed-not-grievance – the way forward lies through building not only 
employment opportunities for young people but also the institutional capital to protect 
and advance those opportunities. Arguably, craft organization and trade-unionism 
have more to offer post-war Sierra Leone than Special Courts and Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions. But we might also reflect that the worst of the war was 
felt both in the deeply disconnected countryside and in Koidu and the capital, 
Freetown – all too readily connected to the global economy, via diamonds, and 
perhaps in future through off-shore oil. The least damaged places – in retrospect – 
proved to be the three main provincial towns. These towns are more economically 
diverse, enjoying both global connectivity and local links - more so than Freetown - to 
the diversity of the countryside. It may be no accident that it is in these three 
provincial towns that we glimpse the beginnings of a reintegration process not only 
connecting ex-combatants to employment but also providing opportunities for former 
fighters actively to contribute to the growth of organic social solidarity. 
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